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Abstract
Though the relationship between China and Africa dates back to the 1950s,
China's ever-increasing demand for energy sources has garnered newfound attention from
scholars, coinciding with the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy over the last
fifteen years. In order to fuel its economic machine, China has turned to Africa, a
resource-rich continent and holder of one-third of the world's oil deposits. Taking a
unique approach that blurs the line between aid, trade, and investment, China‘s search for
resource security has injected new life into Africa‘s developmental efforts. To Africa's
benefit, the relationship has boosted African trade volumes, productivity, physical
infrastructure, and foreign investment but leaves an important question as to how the
"China effect" has actually contributed to the development of its citizens, and not just
African political and business elites.

This study complements prior scholarship by

pursuing a qualitative approach in assessing the development of select countries who
have embarked on Chinese engagement: Angola, Sudan/South Sudan, and South Africa.
This research tests whether having strong ties with China improves both economic and
human development in Africa, aiming to determine whether states that derive high trade
volumes, infrastructure financing, or foreign direct investment from China experience a
trickle-down effect into economic wealth, improved life expectancy of its citizens,
education, and income. The research finds that high levels of economic engagement
between select African countries and China have contributed positively to the country‘s
economic and human development but have also revealed vulnerabilities in those
countries‘ economies due to their reliance on China.
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1 Introduction
Over the last ten years, the meteoric growth of the People‘s Republic of China has
dominated the international economic agenda, and the superlatives that describe the
country‘s economic might are hard to ignore: China is the world‘s second-largest
economy by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the largest exporter of goods, and the
second largest oil consumer (The World Bank 2015). Along the way, China has taken an
unlikely economic partner along for the ride: Africa. The casual Westerner may not have
observed that China and Africa have one of the fastest-growing economic relationships in
today's global economy.

Although the relationship took root in the mid-twentieth

century, its growth accelerated in the 2000s, evolving into a multi-faceted economic
engagement characterized by trade, infrastructure development, and foreign direct
investment (FDI). According to International Trade Statistics, two-way trade volume
stood at $10 billion in 2001 and skyrocketed to $200 billion for 2013 (World Trade
Organization 2014). What is the reason for the dramatic increase?
According to some scholars, double-digit economic growth, mounting industrial
production, an automotive revolution, and a rising standard of living for China‘s middle
class all combine to fuel China‘s demand for oil and minerals (Ofodile 2008). To
illustrate this growth, China transformed itself from a leading Asian oil exporter in 1993
into the second-largest world consumer in 2003 (Alden 2012). Today, China stands as
the largest net importer of oil in the world, having surpassed the United States in
September 2013 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2015). In its quest to secure
sources of energy, China has turned to resource-rich Africa, which holds the third largest
oil reserves in the world with an estimated 9.5 percent of total deposits (Alden 2012, 27).
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The African continent possesses a generous endowment of natural resources such as
hydrocarbons, precious metals, and timber, which remains mostly untapped due to
decades of political instability, poor infrastructure, and lack of investments. Major oilproducing nations such as Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan are among the beneficiaries in
having secured an energy consumer like China as a trading partner. South Africa has also
become a leading exporter of natural resources such as a copper, iron, timber, diamonds,
and other extractable minerals that help supply China‘s massive manufacturing industry
(Alden and Alves 2009, 41).
Aside from increased trade volume in natural resources, economic engagement
takes the form of Chinese government-backed development programs and FDI flows. In
an attempt to solidify and stabilize this relationship, China invests heavily in African
infrastructure, education, media, and healthcare.

From a financial perspective, the

Export-Import Bank of China extends assistance to the tune of billions of dollars in the
form of low-interest or interest-free loans and debt forgiveness (Brautigam 2011, 204).
China has constructed railroads and telecommunications lines in Angola, built
hydroelectric dams and coal-fired power plants in Sudan, set-up state-owned television
channels in Kenya, and is building a $10 billion port in Tanzania (AidData 2015).
Furthermore, China provides humanitarian assistance, land-mine clearance, weapon
removal, and the monitoring of war crimes in some regions in Africa (Li and Dottin
2011). Encouragingly, investment interest in Africa is not limited to the government:
Chinese private enterprises have also increased their FDI flows into African agriculture,
mining, manufacturing industries in Nigeria and South Africa over the last fifteen years.
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According to China‘s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), FDI stocks1 in Africa was
nearly non-existent in 2000 but has grown to $21 billion in 2012 (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2015), making China one of the key drivers of
FDI flows into Sub-Saharan Africa.
The scope of economic engagement is broad, diverse, and evolving. Africa, with
its plentiful resources, faces a historic opportunity to accelerate socioeconomic progress
through tackling age-old problems such as poverty, disease, and infrastructure deficiency.
In light of the growing economic engagement with China, scholars have remarked that
―there is much that Africa could gain from the relationship‖ (Ofodile 2008).

The

question is: to what degree?
China‘s appetite for natural resources has clearly contributed to sharp increases in
African exports to the benefit of the government and the mining and extractive industries,
but the developmental effect on the average African citizen remains unclear and largely
unaddressed by existing literature. Most scholars have focused on the impact of Chinese
engagement on Africa as a generalized, singular actor; few have attempted to analyze the
relationship at the individual state level—and even less on the human developmental
impact on its citizens. In an effort to assess the socioeconomic effects of Sino-African
engagement, and to fill such gaps in literature, this research will test the hypothesis that
having strong economic ties with China increases economic and human development
among select Sub-Saharan African countries.

The dependent variable is African

development, bifurcated into economic development and human development

1

FDI stocks measure the total level of direct investment at a given point in time (Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development).
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components, measured as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Domestic Product
Per Capita for economic development and the United Nations Development Programme‘s
(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI). The independent variables are the various
ways in which China economically engages in Africa, specifically via trade,
infrastructure finance, and FDI. This study will incorporate certain geographical SubSaharan nations as its sample population. Using empirical data, this research determines
the effect of Sino-African engagement on African development with the goal of revealing
the relationship between the two sets of variables.

2 Research Design
As already noted, this paper will test the hypothesis that having strong economic
ties with China increases development among Sub-Saharan African countries.

The

period in focus will be from 2000 to 2013, consistent with the start of rapid economic
growth of China which, in turn, has driven China's need to procure natural resources from
Africa. Ideally, this paper would have encompassed data through 2014, but relevant data
is not yet readily available in early 2015. Because China pursues political and economic
partnerships on a bilateral basis, the units of observation are individual Sub-Saharan
African states, focusing specifically on Angola, Sudan and South Sudan, and South
Africa due to their strong trade relationships with China. Sudan and South Sudan were
considered one country until South Sudan‘s independence on July 9, 2011, but after this
the data used will exclude South Sudan.. I will begin by examining the economic and
human development profiles of each state prior to Chinese economic engagement and
then qualitatively assess the same variables after 2000 in search of trends. After this, I
will test the effect of economic ties on developing by correlating the variables of Total
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Trade with China, the value of infrastructure financing from China, and FDI inflows from
China against GDP, GDP Per Capita, HDI, and its individual components, which include
Gross National Income (GNI) Per Capita, life expectancy at birth, and expected years of
schooling.

I will employ a time lag of 5 years in my quantitative analysis on the

assumption that it take some time for trade and investment to have an effect on a country.
Operationalizing the dependent variable of

―development‖

components: economic growth and human development.

yields two

Gross Domestic Product2

(GDP) and Gross Domestic Product Per Capita3 (GDP Per Capita) serve as observations
for the economic growth component. The absolute value of GDP allows for observation
of the economic strength of the country‘s economy, while GDP Growth—the year-onyear change in GDP—serves as evidence of economic expansion. Because most SinoAfrican engagement takes place on the ground in Africa, measuring GDP would most
effectively capture China‘s effect on the local economy. GDP Per Capita is an equally
important measure as it considers economic productivity in light of a country‘s
population.
Development implies not just growth but also human advancement. Therefore economic
data alone cannot truly measure China‘s contribution to an African country‘s overall

2

GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the

economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
products. (UNDP)
3

GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of

gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products. (UNDP)
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development. Consequently, this study considers the human development component,
operationalized by the Human Development Index (HDI). Developed by UNDP, this
index measures a country‘s achievement in three basic dimensions of human
development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (mean years
and expected years of schooling) and a decent standard of living (Gross National Income
per capita based on purchasing power parity). The UNDP‘s HDI figures are for select
years: 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2010-2013.

I will also use Government Per Capita

Expenditure on health and education as a measure of a state‘s will to develop by investing
in its own citizens.

An increase in expenditure represents a stepping stone toward

achieving tangible development results.
The independent variables represent three specific types of economic engagement
between Africa and China, representing the bulk of monetary flows from China into
Africa. The first variable is total trade between the individual African state and China,
that is, exports and imports. Data will come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
database on trade statistics. The second variable is the value of infrastructure financing
received by the individual state. Infrastructure finance involves the issuance of large
commercial-rate long-term lines of credit for the construction of public works, of which
the repayment is secured by trade exports of African natural resources such as oil. These
public works particularly focus on hydropower generation, railways, and highways. The
World Bank maintains a database of infrastructure finance commitments, disbursements,
and other statistics on a country-by-country basis within the specified timeframe, upon
which this research will draw. The third variable is the value of FDI flows into Africa
from China.

FDI represents investments by private Chinese companies in African
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business enterprises, whether through acquisitions, controlling stakes, joint ventures, or
projects. Available data on FDI may not fully reflect the true value of all FDI flows, due
to the fact that inflows are not always publicly declared. China‘s Ministry of Commerce
maintains a limited database of FDI flows to Africa, while The Heritage Foundation and
the American Enterprise Institute maintain a comprehensive dataset of large Chinese
investment transactions.

Most FDI databases do not include smaller transactions

(considered valued under $100 million). Data may not also include acquisitions in
African companies whose domicile is outside its main place of business, such as a South
African company incorporated in Switzerland.
I will employ three case studies, Sub-Saharan African countries whose economic
relationship with China can be identified as a significant factor in their development:
Angola, Sudan, and South Africa. These states share many similarities which make them
natural choices as case studies: their histories have been plagued by tremendous internal
conflict that left each state divided and devastated. As such, they have all been recipients
of significant Western financial and humanitarian aid. Each country possesses bountiful
stores of oil and minerals on which their economies are vastly dependent for growth.
Their ability to export large quantities of natural resources has attracted the attention of
China, leading to high levels of economic engagement. For example, in 2007 these three
countries represented the top 65 percent of overall African exports to China, with Angola
comprising 34 percent, South Africa 20 percent, and Sudan 11 percent, demonstrating the
importance of these countries in overall Sino-African trade (Ayodele and Sotola 2014,
13). Because of their resource bounties, these states have also been significant recipients
of Chinese infrastructure financing and FDI inflows, having received no less than $20
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billion of FDI inflows combined over the last nine years (The Heritage Foundation and
The American Enterprise Institute 2015). As large, sub-Saharan states, each suffers from
some degree of infrastructure deficit, making infrastructure finance a particularly critical
necessity. Each country has dealt with China for a minimum of 15 years, which means
that ample data is available.
For all their similarities, there are also differences which allows for contrast. For
example, while each state has a large amount of exports to China, the composition of
those exports are different. Oil makes up nearly all of Angola‘s exports to China, which
in turn, accounts for nearly a quarter of the Angola‘s overall GDP. Sudan‘s oil exports to
China accounted for nearly 14 percent of its GDP before independence of South Sudan,
after which that number dropped to a mere 3 percent of GDP, according to the IMF.
Because the economies of Angola and Sudan are highly reliant on oil, for which China is
their biggest customer, the development of Angola and Sudan should be highly correlated
with their level of exports to China. On the other hand, South Africa boasts a relatively
stable economy that is three times the size of Angola‘s and with a far more diversified
export base mostly made up of metals and minerals. Though exports to China are a
growing sector of its economy, they only comprise around 3.4 percent of its overall GDP
compared to Angola and Sudan, but the absolute value of the exports are nearly as large.
Thus, South Africa‘s stable economy and growing Chinese engagement enables me to
test China‘s impact on a moderately-developed country, where developmental impacts
may be more subtle and less volatile. Given the diversity of these states, I expect to find
some unique perspectives on how engagement with China impacts the development of
states.
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Limitations to the Research
One may wonder if a researcher can reliably attribute a country's economic
growth purely to Chinese engagement. Although this research will consider the sample
country‘s level of engagement with China as a percentage of the country‘s overall GDP
(for example, Angola‘s total trade with China versus Angola‘s GDP), it does not consider
the potential unique arrangements between the sample countries and countries outside of
China.

Therefore, it is possible that an African country can experience higher

development due to another economic partnership outside of China, but that remains
outside the scope of this research. Nonetheless, I will attempt to qualitatively assess the
impact of Sino-African engagement on the economic and human development of the
selected African states.

3 Literature Review
In reviewing the progress of research on the Sino-African relationship, early
literature focuses on assessing China's rise as a diplomatic and economic power through
the latter half of the twentieth century, while drawing parallels to Western colonialism.
Two questions prevailed: Why Africa? How is the relationship different from the West's
relationship with Africa?

Further, because the China-in-Africa phenomenon only

emerged in the last twenty years, works from the 1990s and the early 2000s took a largely
descriptive and qualitative approach, generally viewing the relationship through a
political science lens.

However, as the relationship between China and Africa

strengthened and grew more prosperous through the turn of the twenty-first century,
empirical data became more accessible and reliable, therefore contributing to more
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quantifiable research. Over the last ten years, scholars have increasingly focused on
more specific issues such as development, aid, and socioeconomic issues. The following
section gathers prevalent themes, debates, and observations from existing literature in an
effort to better understand this research.

The first section summarizes theoretical

perspectives on development and traditional forms of aid in the context of Africa. The
second part describes China‘s ascent as an economic and political power and gathers
theoretical observations on the motivations of its foreign policy in Africa. Next, I briefly
describe the framework of Sino-African engagement and offer a comparison of scholars‘
views on China‘s unique ―win-win‖ approach to developmental assistance. The section
following aggregates what scholars have identified as benefits and risks to Africa with
regard to engaging with China. Then, I highlight the different lenses through which
scholars view Africa, namely on whether they take an aggregated or disaggregated
approach. Finally, I set forth how my research will serve to complement and expand the
existing literature.

Broader Issues on Development and Foreign Aid
In order to effectively comprehend China‘s unique impact on African
development, one must consider broader literature on the value of foreign aid and its
effectiveness at promoting development. Edwards organizes existing scholarship into
three distinct camps (2015): The first camp believes that official development assistance
is ineffective and does more harm than good for poor countries. In its traditional form,
ODA creates dependency, fosters corruption, encourages currency overvaluation, and
perpetuates poverty, while the continuous stream of aid disbursements effectively
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prevents poor countries from attempting taking advantage of the opportunities provided
by the global economy (Edwards 2015). Scholars such as Moyo argue that governmentto-government foreign aid has harmed Africa and should be phased out in favor of free
markets, self-help, development financing (Moyo 2010).
The second camp believes that aid levels have been insufficient and that large
increases are needed to reduce property. Sachs, a foremost proponent of this scheme of
foreign aid, argues that impoverished countries with impoverished governments are
incapable of solving developmental issues on their own. Therefore, aid programs are
necessary to spur economic growth and successfully prepare countries to tackle future
priorities. Examples effective types of aid efforts include: support for peasant farmers to
help them grow more food, childhood vaccines, malaria control with bed nets and
medicines, adequate school meals, training and salaries for community health workers,
all-weather roads, electricity supplies, safe drinking water, antiretroviral medicines for
AIDS sufferers, and clean low-cost cook stoves to prevent respiratory disease of young
children (Sachs and Ayittey 2012).
A third camp—which includes scholars such as Collier, Banerjee, and Duflo—
steers between the previous two schools of thought, arguing that there is need for a
radical rethinking of the way to fight poverty. Collier believes that such solutions include
military intervention for poor nations, international charters to promote good governance,
and preferential access to trade (Edwards 2015). Banerjee and Duflo‘s main argument
calls for an evidence-based approach, rooted in the need for randomized control trials to
test the impact of policies aimed at beating poverty and promoting development. The
approach ultimately uncovers that certain projects financed by official aid work are
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effective in reducing poverty and moving the domestic populations towards selfsufficiency and prosperity, while other programs fail miserably. The question is not how
aggregate aid programs have fared in the past, but rather, how to evaluate whether
specific programs are effective (Banerjee and Duflo 2012).
Further to these three schools of thought, current literature suggests that there are
three principal disagreements that shape debates on foreign aid. Firstly, scholars argue
the extent to which aid is simply an instrument of foreign policy, potentially undermining
the intention for aid to improve the lives of the impoverished. The distribution of aid
may be motivated more by domestic politics in the developed nations than by recognition
of the need for improving conditions elsewhere; scholars believe that this reality may
actually harm developing nations (Brautigam 2011). Secondly, scholars such as Moyo
and Sachs argue on the types of foreign aid that are most beneficial in combating poverty,
regardless of the motivation, as outlined in the previous paragraphs. Thirdly, debates also
surround the importance of foreign aid compared with other forms of economic activity,
such as international trade, in raising living standards—a concept that this research will
incorporate in measuring China‘s impact on African development.

Background on China‘s Aid to Africa
When discussing development, scholars draw on China‘s own developmental
history as a means to explain the Sino-African relationship and to describe Africa‘s own
road to development. For example, Power (2011) notes that Chinese leaders believe their
own experience and vision of development resonates powerfully with African
counterparts, while the ―longstanding history of friendly political linkages and
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development cooperation offers a durable foundation for future partnership.‖ This vision
of development centered on building a self-reliant political ally and a sustainable trading
partner for China. Power (2011) also describes development as ―modernization‖ in the
form of industrial technology and infrastructure as in the case of China and Angola.
Effectively, China uses its own experience as a developmental success story to build
economic relations with African states who view China as a role model.

Most

scholarship views development through an economic lens, drawing on traditional
indicators such as trade flow statistics and FDI, given the availability of data, which has
allowed for clearer assessment on Africa‘s progress.
Some scholars also measure development in the context of environmental
sustainability, which is generally defined as a state in which the demands placed on the
environment can be met without reducing its capacity to allow a country‘s citizens to live
well. Despite the fact that Africa has a ―resource bounty,‖ Chinese companies entered
African countries and have left a damaging environmental impact due to exploration
activities. African regulations are generally poorly-implemented and therefore provide
low environmental protection standards (Alden and Alves 2009). Therefore, describing
mining activities as a contributor to African development would heavily discount the
negative environmental impacts of the relationship.
Lastly, with regard to the impacts of Sino-African engagement, the international
relations community seems to have largely neglected the role of human development.
Mohan acknowledges the absence of meaningful literature, stating that there has been
little discussion on the ―core issues to development: well-being, equity, and
environmental sustainability‖ (Mohan 2013). This research seeks to address this concern
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and fill the gap in literature.
Traditionally, economic engagement with Africa consists of the distribution of aid
in the form of grants and loans, primarily by Western powers. Such assistance adhered to
the standard definition of official development assistance (ODA), agreed upon by the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the
World Bank and bilateral sources such as United States, United Kingdom, France and
Germany have historically been the largest donors to Africa. Aid classified as ODA must
meet specific criteria: firstly, aid must promote economic development and welfare in a
recipient country, usually by allocating funds toward reducing poverty and addressing
basic needs. Secondly, aid must be given on a concessional basis (Brautigam 2009). The
reasons behind offering aid may be political, commercial, or moral in nature, and
oftentimes all three motives combine in a package. Brautigam (2009) and Samy (2010)
note that political and strategic factors motivate bilateral donors as much as the needs of
the recipient, inextricably linking foreign policy objectives and aid. However, scholars
have noted several flaws with the traditional method of distributing aid. Because of the
concessional nature of grants and loans, Western donors tends to attach too many strings.
Also, a common gripe is the lengthy delay for the disbursement of funds as they have to
clear the hurdles of good economic policies, good governance, environmental
sustainability, labor standards, and human rights (Samy 2010).
China was no stranger to this type of aid, given that grants and loans served as its
primary methods of distributing economic assistance.

The modern-day economic

relationship between China and Africa dates back to the 1950s, after the formation of the

Achacoso 17
People‘s Republic of China and toward the end of African colonialism. During this
period, the newly-formed China began to actively support decolonization movements in
Africa, adopting a sympathetic, victimized view of colonialism given China‘s historical
occupation by Japan and Europe. One of the earliest gestures of aid came in the form of
an interest-free loan of $25 million to Guinea in 1960 (Brautigam 2009). After Chinese
leaders toured several African states in the early 1960s, they announced formal aid
programs consisting of concession-fee loans with flexible terms, ultimately providing aid
to thirty African countries (Ayodele and Sotola 2014). As China‘s growth expanded at
the turn of the century, the Sino-African relationship evolved into more of a viable
economic partnership instead of just pure diplomacy.
In today‘s world, scholars generally surmise that China extends very little cash
aid. China, in not being a member of the DAC, need not publish official reports, figures,
or evaluations. As a result, empirical data on aid from China to Africa proves limited and
makes it difficult to compare performance relative to other donors (Samy 2010). China‘s
unique approach has nonetheless replaced traditional cash aid: as China underwent rapid
economic expansion, its approach to economic engagement with Africa shifted away
from traditional aid and toward ―mutually beneficial‖ business, in effect, creating
instruments that link aid, trade, and investment together.

Rising China: Motivations for Foreign Policy
Besides China‘s desire to access and secure energy resources to fuel its economy,
scholars have identified other motivations for China‘s ―going out‖ policy, seemingly all
woven from the same political fabric. Firstly, China has expressed a desire to become a
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leader of the Third World. Alden (2012) notes that China was once a victim of Japanese
and European colonialist and imperialist campaigns, leading Beijing to express solidarity
with post-colonial African nations; China has rooted its foreign policy in its own
experience, helping cement its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist credentials. Alden
(2012) also states that Chinese foreign policy has placed China as the leader of
developing countries, and its relationship with Africa will continue to raise its own
international influence and probably that of developing countries as a whole. As part of
its efforts to raise influence, China established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) in 2000 creating a ministerial-level venue that promoted political, economic,
and cultural engagement. Ultimately, China finds itself repeating many of the practices
and the types of deals it forged with Japan and the West, swapping its role from recipient
to financier.
However, Brautigam (2009) and Alden (2012) believe that the reasons for
engagement stretch beyond simple support for revolutionary movements.

Rather, a

diplomatic motive has driven China to forge relationships with African states in an effort
to reinforce its ―One China‖ policy. Beijing‘s leaders viewed African aid programs as a
foreign policy tactic to convince new governments that Beijing was the true ―China‖ in
attempt to de-recognize its diplomatic arch-rival Taiwan.
One of the most visible motivations for China‘s engagement has been to boost own
development through the nurturing of self-reliant countries.

Brautigam notes that

―foreign aid has become one tool in a range of economic instruments adeptly managed by
China‘s state leaders to boost…its own development‖ (2009, 25).

By proactively

promoting the economic development of African nations, China seeks to establish new
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exports markets for its light manufacturing, services, agro-processing, apparel, and
communications offerings (Adisu, Sharkey and Okoroafo 2010, 4).

The effect of

fostering trade results in the growth of competitive Chinese multi-national companies,
which then encourage the upgrading of its own domestic firms.
Ultimately, scholars believe that China‘s motives for its engagement in Africa are
political and economic in nature, which is no different than that of the major donor
governments.

The difference, however, is the manner in which they go about

engagement, which is outlined in the next section.

―Mutually-Beneficial‖: China‘s New Take on Economic Cooperation

To describe China‘s economic engagement with Africa as centered on ―aid‖
would severely limit the scope of their engagement, and scholars would highlight
potential confusion with the traditional concept of ODA (Brautigam 2009, Samy 2010).
China‘s reformed approach challenges the West‘s architecture by broadening its scope
from just grants to a number of vehicles: concession-free loans, joint ventures,
infrastructure finance, and public and private investments, all with an objective of
developing an economically-sustainable trading partner in Africa. Scholars point out that
China‘s aid policies are linked to its foreign policy objectives in the same manner as
traditional Western donors (Samy 2010), but the difference lies in how it is carried out.
The following section describes the different ways in which China has economically
engaged in Africa and how African states benefit from the relationship.
Unlike Western powers who traditionally rely on multilateral institutions to
facilitate the distribution of African aid, China takes a more direct approach by assigning
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responsibility to state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises, which in turn develop
bilateral relations with individual African states. Key actors include the China Export
Import Bank (Eximbank) which extends preferential loans known as ―export credits‖ to
Chinese companies abroad and the China Development Bank which provides nonconcessional development finance. Additionally, state-owned enterprises also share in
the responsibility to carry out Chinese government policy, given that they are recipients
of preferential contracts and finance from the state-owned banks. The key African actors
are governments and their leaders, as well as state-owned enterprises, such as Sonangol
of Angola and the Sudan National Petroleum Corporation (Sudapet).

Trade
The most obvious and well-discussed method of engagement revolves around
trade.

In its simplest form, China—a massively industrial nation with a resource

deficiency—has sought to diversify its procurement of natural resources by turning to
Africa—a resource-rich but socioeconomically poor continent. States such as Nigeria,
Angola, Sudan, South Sudan, and South Africa have led the region in mining and
extractive industry exports, most notably in oil but also in ores, metals, minerals, and
agricultural raw materials. China believes that such high levels of trade result in a ―winwin‖ situation, a phrase that permeates Chinese state rhetoric when describing its
relations with Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
2006). Scholars agree, having almost universally-accepted natural resource trade as the
primary driver of African economic growth. However, scholars have noted that growing
trade does not necessarily translate into poverty reduction or development, highlighting
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that ―there is a real danger that further expansion of mineral and petroleum exports to
Asia will only reinforce an exclusionary model which will do little to reduce poverty and
may exacerbate conflict and give rise to negative environmental impacts‖ (Eisenman
2012, 808). Though the sheer export figures are hard to ignore, scholars point out that
Africa benefits from importing cheap consumer goods from China that are affordable to a
large number of people (Ayodele and Sotola 2014). Data from the IMF shows that
countries like Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa are importing more from China in recent
years than ever before.

Though encouraged by increasing imports, more recent

scholarship expresses concern over the sustainability of massive trade imbalances in
favor of China.

There is also a worrying trend emerging that top African exports

singlehandedly consist of raw materials, while imported goods are overwhelmingly
manufactured goods.

Although Beijing may use a positive tone in describing its

economic relationship with Africa, some scholars argue that ―mutually beneficial‖ and
―win-win‖ are terms that must be used with guarded optimism (Ofodile 2008, 510).
Infrastructure Finance
As one of the unique schemes of Sino-African economic engagement,
infrastructure finance allows African countries to receive favorable infrastructure loans
from China, which in turn receives African natural resources as repayment for the loan.
Often referred to as ―Angola mode‖ or ―resources for infrastructure,‖ the China
Eximbank primarily makes use of this structure, providing interest-free or low-interest
loans in exchange for the security of natural resources.

Furthermore, infrastructure

finance deals are partly tied to participation of China‘s own contractors who provide the
technical expertise, equipment, and sometimes, manpower, to embark on projects such as
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construction of hydropower stations, the rehabilitation of existing and construction of
new railroads, and the building of information and communication technology networks.
Why develop Africa in this manner? According to scholars, Africa has a resource excess
but an infrastructure deficit. Power generation is unreliable and distribution is poor,
while road freight costs on average are two to four times higher than in the U.S. (Foster,
et al. 2009, xv). The vast distances between towns, cities, and ports, combined with the
lack of adequate transportation and distribution networks, dramatically raises the cost of
cheap goods.
This financing scheme allows for countries with limited creditworthiness to
participate, though it comes as no surprise that resource-rich states such as Nigeria,
Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan account for 70 percent of Chinese financing commitments
(Foster, et al. 2009, 36). Haifang notes that some scholars praise the Angola mode as ―an
innovative model that embodies China‘s notion of win-win cooperation‖ and that Chinese
investment is ―highly valuable and significant‖ (Ayodele and Sotola 2014, 10), while
others describe the structure as ―unequal equals‖ or as an ―asymmetrical bilateral
relation‖ (Power and Alves 2012).
Despite the differing opinions on the fairness of the model, the increasing scale of
infrastructure finance—and therefore the opportunity for Africa—is hard to ignore. In
recent years, a number of emerging economies have played an increasingly important
role in the finance of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa, with combined resource flows
comparable in scale to traditional ODA (Foster, et al. 2009). Foster (2009) also notes that
Chinese finance is on a scale large enough to make a material contribution toward
meeting Africa‘s vast infrastructure needs, offering an important development
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opportunity for the region.

Foreign Direct Investment
While government policy through state-owned banks and enterprises has been a
key driver in the burgeoning Sino-African relationship, sustainable economic
development in Africa also requires the involvement of the private sector (Ofodile 2008).
In an effort to foster overseas investment by private Chinese companies, the Chinese
state-owned banks have provided incentives in the form of diplomatic support, tax
exemptions, easier emigration approvals, insurance, and preferential lines of credit
(Brautigam 2009). For example, China Development Bank granted telecommunications
giant Huawei a $10 billion line of credit, while China National Oil Company extended a
$1.6 billion loan for investments in Nigeria (Brautigam 2009). Furthermore, Eximbank
extended attractive lines of credit to large construction firms to build casinos and
stadiums overseas. While these may seem outsized numbers, Ofodile notes that FDI
from developing countries is indeed increasing, having accounted for 17 percent of
world‘s flows, much of which comes from China (2008, 519). FDI flows amounted to
$14.7 billion in 2012, having grown more than 60 percent from 2009; overall, China‘s
investment in Africa has exceeded $40 billion through various types of investments
(Ayodele and Sotola 2014, 7).

However, although FDI has generally been on the

uptrend, some scholars agree that flows from year to year are inconsistent: Chinese
enterprises exhibited huge investment from 2005-2008 which tapered in 2009-2010
(Ayodele and Sotola 2014), indicating that the ―growth is not particularly steady‖
(Brautigam 2009, 88). As China‘s private sector continues to expand globally, FDI
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outflows to Africa will continue to grow and will be key to Africa‘s sustainable
development.

Pros and Cons of Engagement
Africa has reaped many benefits from its relationship with China in the realm of
economic development. Firstly, African states receive preferential loans from Chinese
development banks that have either low-interest rates or are interest-free. These loans are
often concession-free or have very limited concessions, whereas loans from the West—
such as World Bank and IMF—come with a laundry list of requirements: good
governance, political liberalization and democratization, and fiscal discipline (Ayodele
and Sotola 2014, 66) and are often directed to where the West wants it to go (Mohan
2013). On the other hand, Chinese-backed loans do not attach such conditions. The
terms of the Chinese-backed loans are often flexible, and repayments can easily be
rescheduled to a later date.
Secondly, Africa has encountered a demand-hungry market for its extractable
resources in China resulting in increased export revenues. This relatively new trade
relationship comes at a time when the U.S. has dramatically decreased its purchases of
African petroleum compared to historical levels. In 2005 the U.S. imported 425 million
barrels from Nigeria, and in 2006 the U.S. reached a peak import level of 195 million
barrels from Angola. Those numbers have dropped to around 33 million and 55 million
barrels respectively in 2014 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2015).
Thirdly, the unique infrastructure finance scheme between Africa and China
allows for the development of highways, railways, power generation, ports, and telecom
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infrastructure, directly reducing Africa‘s infrastructure deficit. The construction of the
Tan-Zam railway in the 1970s serves as the classic example, whereby China financed and
constructed a 2,000 kilometer railway from land-locked Zambia to the Tanzanian coast
(Brautigam 2009). In 2011, the Chinese provided financing to build a new dock in Dar es
Salaam that can accommodate car megaships which can haul more vehicles from China
and 30 percent faster.

Smaller-scale projects are also eligible for financing, as the

Chinese have helped fund the construction of schools, media centers, hospitals, and
stadiums.
Africa also benefits from cheap imports from China, not just from a pure price
standpoint, but from the availability of certain types of goods that are generally much
cheaper than those coming from Europe. For example, the relatively low prices of
Chinese consumer goods such as mobile phones and computers give Internet access to
millions of Africans (Ayodele and Sotola 2014). Items that were traditionally seen as
exclusively for the rich have made their way into poorer communities. Furthermore,
local African entrepreneurs are playing a more direct role in sourcing consumer goods
and distributing them, suggesting increased African participation in the supply chain
(Mohan and Lampert 2012, 101).
Aside from economic gains, scholars note that Africans stand ready to reap
intangible benefits in the form of intellectual property, training, and technology transfer.
For example, in the agricultural industry, Alden (2012) notes that the Chinese propose to
introduce new techniques, seed varieties, and training programs derived from their own
experience raising agricultural productivity; the Chinese government has even
constructed ten new agricultural training centers across Africa to aid in the process. In
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the industrial and manufacturing space, the Chinese have provided technicians to oversee
installation and train their local counterparts in operating, maintaining, and repairing
machinery (Mohan and Lampert 2012, 101).
Although scholars broadly suggest that the aforementioned advantages are key
drivers to future African growth, many works highlight the risks associated with
engaging with China and take a cautionary tone in discussing how Africa should best
proceed with the relationship. Firstly, there is a danger that China‘s engagement, to the
extent that it is heavily predicated on natural resources, may reinforce Africa‘s own
dependence on natural resources, pointing to an even greater need for ensuring that
resource ﬂows and policies target other sectors outside the extractable resource industry
(Samy 2011, 76). Secondly, the threat of irresponsible borrowing may potentially worsen
the financial status of African governments instead of helping reduce their debt burden.
As previously mentioned, the bulk of Chinese aid to African countries comes in the form
of concessional loans with very low interest rates, rather than outright grants.

The

international community and civil society have both raised the concern that these cheap
loans may encourage recipient countries to borrow irresponsibly and accumulate debt
beyond their ability to repay, despite China‘s efforts to promote sustainable growth
(Brautigam 2011). Thirdly, scholars suggest that the Chinese presence may hurt local
producers given the proliferation of Chinese retail shops in urban and rural communities
and their introduction of low-cost consumer goods—a notion that spurs resentment
among the local Africans.
With regard to risks of Sino-African economic engagement, one of the oldest
debates has been whether China‘s presence in Africa represents a new wave of

Achacoso 27
exploitative colonialism or imperialism that had historically plagued Africa. Ofodile
(2008) suggests that African leaders and their constituents must guard against
imperialism of any sort, given that there is no evidence that South-South cooperation is
more progressive or less selfish than North-South. To illustrate the potential exploitative
nature of the relationship, Mohan (2013) introduces the concept of enclaves, which are
self-contained gated compounds that serve as the base for projects but results in limited
linkage to the local economy and yields little or no benefit to the wider society. Critics
also argue that the Chinese migrants do not integrate, which the conservative and liberal
internationalist scholars interpret as evidence of their exploitative intentions (Mohan
2013).

The counterargument is that traditional neocolonialism relies on absolute

exploitation of African land and labor, whereas the Chinese practice ―national selfexploitation‖ by importing their own labor (Mohan 2013, 1263). Neither argument
suggests that the relationship is beneficial for African development. However, on a more
positive note, some scholars remind that China is not a former colonial power—in fact, it
found itself in the same position as Africa at one point—and so, many leaders see
Beijing‘s model of development as one that could be replicated successfully in Africa
(Ofodile 2008).
Beyond the issue of neo-colonialism, scholars have engaged in discourse over the
issue of exploitative labor practices. Many scholars have cautioned against the risks to
local Africans. For example, Chinese enterprises employ lax safety standards, have
minimum workers‘ rights, or little consideration for health and safety—all factors that put
the health of local African worker at risk. This sentiment reached a boiling point when in
2013, African workers protested against poor wages and working conditions by
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assaulting the Chinese foremen of a Zambian coal mine, resulting in the death of one
Chinese man (Okeowo 2013, 1). In another example, in 2002, forty-five local workers
died in a fire at a Chinese plastics factory in Lagos, Nigeria; the workers were apparently
unable to escape because their Chinese bosses locked them inside (Mohan 2013, 1264).
Scholars further argue that the use of imported Chinese labor in construction projects
takes away opportunities for Africans, a practice that has been criticized in some African
circles (Mohan 2013). Also, local producers get displaced by competition from cheap
imports from China in industries which employ significant numbers of unskilled workers.
As a result, Africans may lose their jobs and be pushed into poverty; riots in Zimbabwe
and Zambia against Chinese merchants provide evidence of the locals‘ displeasure.
Despite the pockets of negative sentiment from locals, Mohan states that governments
like Nigeria ―have done so little to prosecute, compensate, and regulate these issues‖
(Mohan 2013, 1264). As a counterpoint to the adverse labor impacts, Mohan notes that
wages for locals are not necessarily lower and that health and safety standards are no
worse than in other firms, whether Chinese or African, while unionization levels in
Chinese firms are not so different from unions in other sectors. In fact, evidence points to
promotion of welfare and progress; for example, in Kano, Nigeria, a Chinese factory
group is the second biggest employer after the government (Mohan 2013). Furthermore,
Mohan‘s research found that in many cases, local Africans have attained skilled and
managerial positions in Chinese enterprises, which Chinese bosses emphasized makes
good business sense due to low recruitment costs, local market knowledge, effective
management of local workers, and negotiating demands of local officials (2013, 1267).
This suggests that Chinese exploitation of African workers would be impractical, given
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that businesses require local workers in order to function effectively.
Yet another criticism of the engagement revolves around China‘s policy of noninterference in African internal affairs. Some scholars suggest that China turns a blind
eye toward social injustice, pointing out that China‘s official African policy paper
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2006), despite all its
promises of cooperation, is completely silent on the human rights obligations of Chinese
businesses operating in Africa (Ofodile 2008, 531). Western bilateral and multilateral
donors view the non-interference as undermining their own eﬀorts to reduce corruption
and improve governance in Africa, especially when China effectively ignores human
rights and labor and environmental standards (Samy 2010, 85).

For instance, until

recently, the Chinese government had remained silent on the Sudanese government‘s
policy in the Darfur region, indicating that it was not interested in issues beyond its own
economic interests (Samy 2010). Corruption plays a major role in the disbursement of
aid, and China‘s non-interference policy can be especially problematic in countries such
as Angola, Sudan or Zimbabwe whose governments have a reputation for corruption and
non-accountability, raising concerns that aid might not be wisely spent. Thus, there is a
fear that China‘s cooperation with opaque regimes will fail to respect the rights of
indigenous peoples, the environment, and labor standards. However, others such as
Brautigam (2009) point out that China is rethinking that approach, given their willingness
to apply bilateral pressure on a government like Sudan to allow for a U.N. intervention;
this suggests a clear indication that the Beijing government is changing the contours of its
non-interference policy in relation to U.N. action.
Scholars also warn that China‘s dealings with African dictators and political elites
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make for an exploitative relationship. A common argument is that Sino-African trade
relies on close ties to autocratic political forces and is driven by Chinese demand for
resources. Eisenman concurs, cautioning that ―some African countries risk falling victim
to a situation whereby the economy becomes dominated by a single export commodity,
enriching a small group of elites who control natural resources at the expense of the
larger workforce‖ (2012, 807). Mohan refers to the term ―Dutch disease‖ to describe this
phenomenon, defined as the negative impact on an economy of anything that gives rise to
a sharp inflow of foreign currency, such as the discovery of large oil reserves (Financial
Times 2015). The nature of dealing with elites results in a severe lack of public
involvement in negotiating trade and concession agreements. Ofodile (2008) reminds us
that multi-national corporations, both Western and Chinese, are not required to publicly
disclose their basic payments for resources to their governments, resulting in massive
revenue embezzlement.

Aggregation vs. Disaggregation

A recurring theme across Sino-African scholarship is the prevalent treatment of
Africa as a homogenous state. Scholars exhibit the tendency to aggregate individual
African states into a unitary actor when assessing African interaction with China (Li and
Dottin 2011, Mohan 2013, Power 2011).

The aggregation of states results in a

deceptively balanced China–Africa trade relationship when China‘s trade with all 54
African states is taken together (Eisenman 2012, 805). In another method to aggregate
Africa, Western journalists often ―select some horror show regarding ‗poor‘ Africans and
extrapolate to the whole continent‖ (Mohan 2013, 1257).

Not surprisingly, an
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overwhelming portion is the work of Western scholars, whereas African scholars favor
the disaggregation of African states (Ofodile 2008). Although this method may be useful
when describing the Sino-African relationship as a whole, the approach fails to recognize
the uniqueness of each African state, foregoing the disparate impacts that China has on
such states (Ofodile 2008, 566). For example, China exhibits a strong preference toward
bilateral policymaking, and in African politics, governmental elites are highly influential
drivers of such policymaking. By aggregating the behaviors of states, one would neglect
the individuality of the approaches by such actors, and therefore, the unique impacts of
China on those states.

Therefore, scholars suggest avoiding blanket discussions of

―China‖ and ―Africa".
Scholars who disaggregate Africa tend to uncover important observations.

For

example, on a country-by-country basis, the balance of trade between China and
resource-rich African exporters tends to favor the African country whereas the balance
shifts toward China when trading with non-resource exporting African partners
(Eisenman 2012, 805).

Other analyses take inductive approaches in focusing on a

bilateral linkage between China and a particular country and analyzing what this means
for local development (Mohan 2013, 1256). As a result of such findings, some scholars
suggest moving away from singular terms like "African state" toward thinking in more
particular ways about the specific relationships between a diverse constellation of African
actors and foreign economic partners.

This research seeks to meet this call for a

disaggregated approach in an effort to unearth difference in Chinese impact on unique
African states.
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Place in Literature

This review reveals that prior scholarship has placed great emphasis on China‘s
political and economic ambitious in its engagement with Africa as a whole. A majority
of scholars adopt the Chinese government or development banks as actors, while
discussions on Africa largely refer to elites instead of states (Mohan and Lampert 2012,
94). While the hegemonic power of China has drawn widespread intrigue, few scholars
have examined the relationship from an African perspective. Also, research on the impact
on human development is scarce due to limited data and perhaps because the perceived
economic gains have been more easily quantifiable and thus, easier to interpret. Despite
an ample stream of literature, some scholars admit that, while the China-in-Africa story
has graced headlines for nearly a decade, there have been relatively few attempts to
theorize what this means for sub-Saharan African development (Mohan 2013).
As a result, this study seeks to fill the gaps in current literature in three ways.
Firstly, this research will view the Sino-African relationship through a distinctly African
lens, focusing on the progress of African development, rather than on China's motives.
Secondly, because prior studies tend to view Africa as an aggregate unit, this research
instead uses a disaggregated approach to Africa, recognizing bilateral relationships and
adopting individual Sub-Saharan states as the unit of observation.

This research

contributes three in-depth case studies to determine the economic and human
development impact at the state level. This approach meets the call by Ofodile and others
to avoid broad speculations and generalizations in an effort to identify the impact of
economic engagement on different countries in Africa and on different groups within
each country. Because prior scholarship suggests that Sino-African relationships are
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more locally-driven than is generally recognized, realigning focus toward the individual
state must yield distinctive results for each country. Unique observations allows each
country‘s policymakers to learn and adapt more effectively than using the generalizations
and blanket statements of prior scholarship.
Finally, though the Sino-African relationship dates back decades, the effects of
China‘s investment in Africa are relatively new to Africa and have only been measurable
within the last fifteen years. This study combines a qualitative approach with the latest
available data to arrive at empirically-substantiated conclusions.

This diversity in

approach offers a unique method of examining African development that will serve to
complement existing literature.

4 Analysis and Discussion of Findings
This research proceeds by profiling the socioeconomic profiles of each sample
country before the arrival of China. I will then qualitatively and quantitatively test the
independent variables of trade flows, infrastructure finance, and FDI flows in an attempt
to assess their impact on economic and human development, drawing conclusions for
each dependent variable. Finally, I will discuss the implications for each country based
the findings.

Angola: ―The Richest Poor Country in the World‖
Angola has faced a difficult history, having been a victim of imperialism,
decolonization, and civil war. The decolonization process forced the vast majority of
Portuguese settlers to leave the country. However, the colonial administration reserved
all education opportunities for the settler population, so when they left to return to
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Portugal, they took with them all the skills necessary for the functioning of a modern
society (Power and Alves 2012). As a result, nearly all economic activity outside of oil
came to a screeching halt.

At the end of the civil war in 2002, post-conflict

reconstruction became the government‘s priority. The country desperately needed to
revive its economy and rebuild infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict. The
Angolan government instituted policies aimed at a centrally planned economy, but the
resulting nationalization devastated the economy. In 2000, Angola‘s GDP was $9.1
billion and GDP Per Capita was a mere $655 (World Bank). Its HDI figure was 0.377
which placed Angola 160th out of 174 countries, a ranking that the UDNP classifies as
―low human development.‖4

Angola engaged in negotiations with the IMF on aid

packages but talks ultimately collapsed over the conditionality of the loans. The failure
of Angola‘s talks with Western donors left the door open for China to step in and provide
Angola with financial and economic lifelines, beginning with the first Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation in October of 2000; the timing of the forum should be no coincidence
given the start of China‘s economic boom in the same year.

How does Angola engage with China?
Before discussing the impact on development, this section briefly describes
Angola‘s economic engagement with China between 2000 and 2013, highlighting the
most impactful contributions of the independent variables of trade, infrastructure finance,
and FDI. Trade with China proves to be the most obvious and impactful variable given
the sheer volume of petroleum exports, which have historically contributed about a

4

UNDP classifies countries under four categories: Low, medium, high, and very high human development.
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quarter of Angola‘s overall GDP. From an Angolan perspective, China has been its
largest trading partner. As Figure 1 demonstrates, Angola‘s Total Trade with China—
that is, imports plus exports—has grown from only $1.8 billion in 2000 to $36.3 billion in
2013, an overwhelming 99 percent of which has been comprised petroleum (MIT 2015).
Imports have also risen sharply from near-zero in 2000 to $4.3 billion in 2013, though the
chart also highlights a wide trade imbalance. The line shows the growth of China‘s role
in Angola‘s overall economy: though Angola‘s economy stumbled toward the end of its
civil war in the early 2000s—during which a third of its population was internallydisplaced—exports to China have risen from 10 percent of Angola‘s economy to a peak
of 29 percent in 2012. Simply put, Angola has been trading more with China, and the
relationship has grown to a point where trade with China contributes a quarter of
Angola‘s GDP.
Angola has also been the foremost African recipient of infrastructure financing
from China. Through 2007, the World Bank has estimated the value of infrastructure
commitments from China to be a total of $9.8 billion (Foster, et al. 2009, 86-134) with
Eximbank providing most of the funding. These commitments come in the form of loans
or credit lines and have been allocated to projects such as the rehabilitation of power
plants and the extension of transmissions systems in Luanda and Lubango, the
rehabilitation of the Luanda railway, construction of water distribution and drainage
systems, a new international airport in Luanda, expansion of the Angola Telecom
networks, rehabilitation and construction of new roads and highways, and the exploration
of offshore crude oil fields. China has also financed the construction of affordable
housing in concert with President Jose Eduardo dos Santos‘s 2008 pledge to build one
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million homes in four years (Power and Alves 2012). The most symbolic of these
housing projects was a $3.5 billion newly-constructed town of Kilamba that boasts
capacity for 500,000 residents, which was Chinese-financed and repaid with Angolan oil
revenues.
Figure 1. Angola: The Vitality of Exports.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. http://www.imf.org/

FDI has also been a growing source of economic engagement between China and
Angola. The China Global Investment Tracker—a joint project between The Heritage
Foundation and The American Enterprise Institute (2015)—reported at least $9.73 billion
of large-scale FDI inflows between 2005 and 20135. Figure 2 shows how the real estate,
energy, and transport sectors are the dominant recipients of foreign investment,
suggesting that private companies believe these are the sectors with the potential for

5

Because the database only captures investments of over $100 million, this figure likely underestimates the

true value of FDI into Angola.
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growth—all of which are infrastructure-related.

Figure 2: Angola: Total FDI Flows by Sector 2005-2013.

Source: The China Global Investment Tracker, The Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute (2015).

What are the effects on development?
#1. Angola is gaining wealth at a rapid pace because of its exports to China,
which are highly correlated with increases in GDP and GDP Per Capita as economic
indicators, as well as with increases in GNI Per Capita—a component of HDI. An
analysis between the values of exports and those three economic indicators yields
correlations of 0.99, 0.98, and 0.92 respectively, meaning that the value of exports to
China has a strong relationship with the health of the overall economy.
Figure 3: Correlation Table

Exports to China
Exports to China
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Figure 4: Angola’s Exports to China as a Percentage of Overall GDP.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/ and The World Bank Open Data,
http://data.worldbank.org

Also, a regression of exports to China against GDP yields an R Square of 0.97, indicating
that based on the observations, exports to China are an accurate predictor of GDP. Figure
4 displays the relationship between the aforementioned variables, showing that all three
economic indicators have risen in concert with exports in China. In addition, the increase
in GNI Per Capita has a direct positive effect on HDI, and potentially on human
development overall. This data would also suggest that Angola‘s economy is highly
vulnerable to a slowdown in Chinese petroleum purchases.
Skeptics may argue that this analysis does not consider trade with other countries
besides China that may affect the dependent variables. However, this research stresses
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the fact that 61 percent of all Angolan exports go to China—more than 46 percentage
points higher than the next recipient country, which is India at 15 percent (MIT 2015).
Furthermore, one must note that the sharp increase in crude oil prices have aided the
value of exports, having increased from $26 in 2002 to a peak of $145 in 2008 (U.S.
Energy Information Administration 2015).

Therefore, Angola‘s economy is also

vulnerable to a decrease in oil prices. While the number of barrels produced may not
change, the contribution of exports to GDP would potentially decrease in concert with the
price of oil.
#2. The increased level of economic engagement between Angola and China
coincides with the increase in the Human Development Index, lagged 5 years. Data
suggests that human development in Angola is improving in harmony with increased
levels of economic engagement with China. Figure 5 illustrates the increase in the
aggregate independent variables in relation to HDI. The HDI figures reflect a 5 year lag,
which assumes that the implementation time of improved healthcare and education—two
factors in HDI—takes time. The correlation coefficient between Total Trade (imports
plus exports) with China and HDI is 0.81, which suggests a moderately strong
relationship. Furthermore, a regression of those two variables yields an R Square of 0.73;
while trade may not be a particularly strong predictor of human development, it is
nonetheless a contributing factor. The values of infrastructure financing and FDI data are
far smaller and more inconsistent than Total Trade which suggests that their impact is
less apparent, but nonetheless, there is an upward trend starting in 2004. Based on this
data alone, it is possible that the increased revenues and improved infrastructure have
allowed the government to spend more on programs that have benefitted human
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development.

Figure 5: Angola-China Economic Engagement vs. Human Development Index.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/ and The World Bank Open Data,
http://data.worldbank.org, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/, and The China Global Investment Tracker, The
Heritage Foundation/American Enterprise Institute (2015)

#3. As Angola trades more with China, the government is spending more on
healthcare per capita, which may contribute to longer life expectancy at birth. Total
trade and general government healthcare expenditure (GGHE) per capita have a
correlation coefficient of 0.94, indicating a very strong relationship, as Figure 6 shows.
The increase in spending alone may not necessarily indicate that Angolans are healthier,
but rather that the Angolan government shows its will to improve healthcare overall. Life
expectancy at birth—a contributing factor to HDI—has also increased dramatically from
45.2 years in 2000 to 51.9 years in 2013, suggesting that efforts to improve healthcare
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may actually have helped the lives of newborn Angolans.

Besides the Angolan

government, Beijing has also taken a direct approach in financing healthcare projects in
Angola. AidData estimates that Beijing has committed at least $450 million to Angolan
healthcare projects from 2001 to 2013 (AidData 2015).

These efforts include the

construction and rehabilitation of health centers, anti-malarial centers, and municipal
hospitals, as well as the provision of doctors, medicine, and medical equipment.
Figure 6: Total Trade with China vs. General Government Healthcare Expenditure Per Capita.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/
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Figure 7: Total Trade China vs. Life Expectancy at Birth.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/

Despite the encouraging trend lines, one may wonder how selling more oil to
China directly impacts the health of Angolans. Indeed, there are several implementation
steps that must occur in order for oil revenues to translate into longer lives, but the key
point is that both the Angolan and Chinese governments are more committed to the
cause; the increased spending per capita and the Chinese-funded projects display that
resolve. Another counterargument is that according to Power and Alves, ―Clinics are not
used because of lack of doctors or nurses‖ (2012, 2), suggesting that while the
government is spending more to construct facilities, the delivery of healthcare services is
still lacking and that Angola‘s capabilities are not maximized. Nonetheless, the trend of
increasing life expectancy at birth is a statement that the effective is positive; when life
expectancy rises, it has a positive impact on human development given that is a
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contributor to HDI.
#4. In the same period that Angola’s engagement with China has increased,
children are staying in school dramatically longer.
Figure 8. Total Trade with China vs. Expected Years of Schooling for Children.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/

Figure 8 charts Total Trade with China against the Expected Years of Schooling in
Children, lagged 5 years later.

The graph shows in increased in Expected Years of

Schooling from 7.8 years to 11.4 years in a matter of six years, a similar timeframe
during which Angola and China increased their trade volume. Removing the lag reveals
an even more significant increase, with Expected Years of Schooling rising from 5.5
years in 2000 to 11.4 years in 2011. In other words, children are spending up to six more
years in school on average, which is a positive contributor to HDI. The correlation
coefficient between engagement with China and years of schooling is 0.85 lagged and
0.96 with no lag. Though such levels of correlation are unsustainably high and may seem
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spurious, qualitative data provides evidence to support a strong relationship, given that
China has taken a direct approach in contributing to better education. AidData shows that
China has committed no less than $642 million to education projects from 2005 to 2013.
These projects include: the construction and rehabilitation of primary schools, secondary
schools, technical institutes, agricultural schools, and a university campus (AidData
2015).

Critics may argue that despite the construction of new facilities, its impact

remains limited, citing that ―many school buildings remain empty because there are not
enough teachers‖ (Power and Alves 2012, 41). Like healthcare, observations on-theground in Angola suggest that increased spending on education may not always translate
to enrollment. Nonetheless, the increase in expected years of enrollment has been a
positive contributor to human development, even if the education system has yet to be
efficient or maximized.

Implications for Angola
Based on the dramatic increase in Sino-Angolan engagement, as evidenced by
both times series data and qualitative accounts of the independent variables, China has
positively contributed to Angola‘s economic and human development. However, the
sheer percentage of Angola‘s economy attributable to China7, which has historically
averaged around 20 percent since 2000, exposes a vulnerability in Angola‘s economy.
This research suggests that because of the high correlation between engagement and
development, Angola‘s development may slow down significantly should their economic
relationship with China ever sour. Their heavy reliance on oil exports makes for a one-

7

Calculated using Angola-China Total Trade divided by Angola‘s GDP
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dimensional economy. Thus, the Angolan government must learn to diversify Angola‘s
trade counterparties as well as its sources of GDP.
Secondly, despite the dramatic increase in spending for development programs in
healthcare and education, the Angolan government has displayed inefficiency in
implementing those programs, as evidenced by qualitative accounts. In one example, the
“One Million Homes‖ initiative was successful in the construction of homes, but in
reality, the community of Kilamba—designed for 500,000 residents—is a ghost town.
According to news reports, homes are offered for sale anywhere from $125,000 to
$200,000, which are higher than the government‘s mandated $60,000 cap (Power and
Alves 2012, 138). Without any effective government monitoring in place, their efforts to
spur development will be far less impactful.
The case of Angola also shows how human and economic development are
inextricably linked.

For example, although education among children is improving,

education among adults remains a developmental challenge. The lack of skilled workers
has led to poor job creation. When Power and Alves state, ―Only a negligible number of
Angolans are able to find jobs on the many construction sites that abound throughout the
country‖ (2012, 41), they highlight an issue whereby local workers are not participating
in contracted jobs due to their lack of training. Angola labor law states 70 percent of the
workforce on a construction site must be Angolan, but that mandate can be overcome if a
contractor cannot find Angolan nationals with necessary skills to perform a certain job
(Power and Alves 2012). In order to successfully create jobs and spur the economy,
Angolans must seek better education for its workforce in order to take advantage of the
opportunities presented by engagement with China.
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Sudan and South Sudan: ―Oil is Everything‖
Like Angola, Sudan has faced a long history of internal conflict. The decadeslong Second Sudanese Civil War between the northern and southern halves of the country
ended in 2005 with a peace agreement, which resulted in the oil-rich South maintaining
autonomy for six years until the 2011 referendum on secession. In spite of the violent
conflicts, a booming oil industry has helped export revenues support Sudan‘s economy.
Though diplomatic relations between China and Sudan date back to 1959, the
relationship gathered momentum in 2000, coinciding with the start of China‘s economic
boom.

At the time, Sudan exported $732 million worth of commodities to China,

comprising 6 percent of Sudan‘s overall GDP, while imports were valued at $174
million. However, high levels of poverty, poor healthcare, and lack of education factored
into an HDI index of only 0.385, classifying Sudan as a low human development country.

How do Sudan and South Sudan engage with China?
In terms of trade, Sudan‘s relationship with China bears a striking resemblance to
Angola‘s. Similar to Angola, China has been one of Sudan‘s largest trading partners,
with oil accounting for 95 percent of all Sudanese exports to China. Sudan also imports
low cost items and weapons from China, but imports comprise less than half of total
trade, resulting in a wide trade imbalance. Figure 9 explains how the trade relationship
with China had been strengthening throughout the 2000s, with the green line indicating
how exports to China have become an increasingly large part of Sudan‘s overall GDP.
Note the severe drop-off in 2012 resulting from the secession of South Sudan in 2011, a
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crippling economic shock to Sudan that removed half of government revenues and much
of its exports (The World Bank 2015).

Figure 9: Total Trade with China from 2000-2013, plus Exports to China as a Percentage of GDP. Source: IMF.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. http://www.imf.org/

In terms of infrastructure finance, Sudan has been one of the top four recipients of
financing from China. From 2001 to 2007, the World Bank has identified no less than
$1.6 billion of commitments from China for projects such as the construction of
hydroelectric, gas-fired, and coal-fired power plants, the construction of power
transmission lines, railway development, bridges, water treatment plants, and oil and gold
exploration.

Since 2007, AidData has identified another $4.2 billion in new

commitments for construction of a new airport, water distribution networks, railways and
roads.

AidData also suggests that China Eximbank and China National Petroleum
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Corporation (CNPC) have provided the vast majority of financing for such projects
(AidData 2015).
From 2000-2010, Sudan witnessed a remarkable inflow of FDI into its oil sector
from China to the tune of $7.6 billion, while from 2000-2008, non-oil FDI totaled $3.8
billion (Suliman and Badawi 2010, 4). South Sudan‘s reflects a very similar percentage
breakdown. Data suggests about $220 million in FDI flowed into South Sudan in the last
two years, two-thirds of which was allocated toward the energy sector and one-third of
which went to non-oil related sectors, a strikingly similar balance to Sudan (Suliman and
Badawi 2010).
Figure 10: South Sudan: Total FDI Inflows by Sector 2012-2014.

Source: The Heritage Foundation/American Enterprise Institute.

What are the effects on development?
#1. Sudan has gained wealth at a rapid pace because of its exports to China,
which are correlated with increases in GDP and GDP Per Capita, but the secession
of South Sudan exposes the economy’s dangerous reliance on oil. Figure 12 graphs
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this relationship, showing that as exports to China increase (in blue), so does the size of
the economy. The correlation coefficients are a bit weaker than Angola‘s, with Exports
to GDP at 0.72 and Exports to GDP Per Capita at 0.63, but nonetheless, these factors
exhibit a positively correlated relationship. This rings true in 2012 and 2013 after the
secession of South Sudan: as exports decrease, so does overall GDP. GDP Per Capita
remained the same however, likely due to the loss of population to South Sudan.
Figure 11: Correlation Table

Exports to China
GDP
GDP Per Capita
GNI Per Capita in PPP Terms

Exports to China
1.00
0.72
0.63
0.41

GDP

GDP Per Capita
1.00
0.99
0.83

1.00
0.89

Figure 12: Sudan’s Exports to China as a Percentage of Overall GDP. Source: IMF, UNDP

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/ and The World Bank Open Data,
http://data.worldbank.org

GNI Per Capita in
PPP Terms

1.00
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Figures 9 and 12 also expose what can happen to an oil-reliant nation like Sudan
when it loses most of its best-selling product. Indeed, the secession of South Sudan
induced multiple economic shocks, the most important and immediate of which was the
loss of oil revenues. This left large-scale macroeconomic and fiscal challenges and
stunned growth. According to the World Bank, Sudan had failed to develop other parts
of its economy such as agriculture, livestock, and gold during its oil boom years, leaving
the country anxious to rebuild its economy. This highlights the significant role that that
China played in contributing to Sudan‘s economy.
Critics may argue that Sudan‘s other large trade relationships with Japan or the
United Arab Emirates may have contributed to the expansion of the economy. While that
may ring true, this research stresses the fact that China‘s contribution to Sudan‘s GDP
from trade dropped from 14.1 percent of GDP in 2011 to a mere 3.3 percent after the
secession of Sudan, a drop of 10.8 percentage points from one country alone. The
Sudanese economy would likely not have expanded at such a rapid pace were it not for
China, because we see the dramatic negative effect when Chinese trade is greatly
reduced. Skeptics may also cite high oil prices as aiding in the increased GDP figures,
but one should note that GDP continued to rise despite the decrease in oil from 2008
highs of $145 a barrel.
#2. Like Angola, the increased level of economic engagement between Sudan
and China coincides with the increase in the Human Development Index, lagged 5
years.

For economic activity between 2000 and 2008, Sino-Sudanese engagement

coincided with a small increase in Sudanese HDI from 0.42 to 0.47, five years from the
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initial year of activity. The correlation coefficient between Total Trade (the main driver
of economic growth) and lagged HDI is 0.85, suggesting a strong correlation.

Figure 13: Sudan-China Economic Engagement vs. Human Development Index. Source: UNDP, IMF, World Bank,
The Heritage Foundation/American Enterprise Institute.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/ and The World Bank Open Data,
http://data.worldbank.org, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/, and The China Global Investment Tracker, The
Heritage Foundation/American Enterprise Institute (2015)

Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis results in an R Square of 0.82,
suggesting that Total Trade with China is a reasonable predictor of HDI. Infrastructure
Financing and FDI, due to their sporadic nature and therefore lack of consistent year-byyear data, did not meaningfully contribute. The primary driver of the increase in HDI is
likely GNI Per Capita, which is linked to GDP; GDP in turn, is derived from Total Trade.
#3. From 2000-2011, as Sudan traded more with China, the government
spent more on healthcare per capita, which may have contributed to longer life
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expectancy at birth. The correlation coefficient between Total Trade with China and
General Government Healthcare Expenditure Per Capita is 0.93, which suggests a very
strong relationship; this may seem abnormally high or spurious at first, but sharp
decreases in years 2012 and 2013 of both Total Trade and Healthcare Expenditure may
reinforce the relationship.
Figure 14: Total Trade with China vs. Healthcare Expenditure per Capita. Source: IMF, World Bank

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/ and The World Bank Open Data,
http://data.worldbank.org
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Figure 15. Total Trade with China vs. Life Expectancy at Birth.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/

Looking at Figure 15, life expectancy at birth has also significantly increased
from 58 years in 2000 to 62.1 years in 2013. However, the secession of South Sudan
introduced an economic shock, and as Figure 14 shows, the government cut back heavily
on its healthcare expenditure per capita. The question then arises on whether one can
expect life expectancy to decrease in the future, as a result of the decreased spending.
Data suggests that Sudanese are living longer, but the sustainability of the uptrend will
depend on the government‘s commitment to healthcare.
On the other hand, qualitative data paints a picture that is less rosy than what
empirical data puts forward. For example, according to the World Bank, access to basic
health services remains low, covering 40 to 50 percent of the population, and regional
disparities are particularly acute as health facilities are unevenly distributed. Similarly,
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the World Health Organization (WHO) notes that healthcare remains underfunded by the
government although the private sector is ―growing at a rapid pace‖ though ―concentrated
in major cities and focuses on curative care‖ (World Health Organization 2014).
Nevertheless, Sudan has embarked on developing a roadmap for providing universal
health for its population.

China‘s involvement with Sudanese healthcare has been

sporadic at best, though Beijing has assisted by providing grants to rehabilitate health
centers, building mobile clinics and a hospital, and by sending Chinese medical teams.
In summary, trade with China has enabled Sudan to experience increased
revenues from oil, which in turn have allowed the Sudanese government has increase its
government spending on healthcare

However, in practicality, the distribution of

healthcare remains inefficient and inconsistent, and the secession of South Sudan
introduced a shock that has rattled the government‘s ability to promote healthcare
development. Sudan‘s dependence on oil means that they cannot rely on China to boost
their healthcare programs through revenues or aid. Sudan must maintain keen focus on
the investment and distribution of healthcare in order to continue the encouraging trend
of longer life expectancy.
#4. Education has only improved marginally and is not a strong contributor
to the increase in HDI. Expected Years of Schooling in Children has only increased
from 6.0 years to 7.3 years on a 5-year lagged basis as shown by Figure 16. However,
Figure 17 shows that with no lag, education improves from 4.5 years to 7.3 years.
Effectively, students are staying in school longer which coincides with the increase in
Total Trade with China. This positive trend directly contributes to the improvement of
HDI over the same time period. The correlation coefficient between Expected Years of

Achacoso 55
Schooling in Children and Total Trade with China is 0.79, which indicates a fairly strong
relationship. However, like the previous discussion on life expectancy at birth, the
secession of South Sudan seems to have caused a levelling-out in Expected Years of
Schooling. The question then arises on whether one can predict a decrease in expected
Years of Schooling in the future due to the reduction of the overall wealth of the
economy. China has provided some assistance over the years in the realm of education
by providing $10 million in financing for higher education, building an institute at a
university, and constructing rural schools in various regions (AidData 2015). However,
China‘s relatively limited allocation to education projects renders oil revenues as the key
driver for education spending and improvement.

Figure 16: Total Trade with China vs. Expected Years of Schooling in Children (Lagged 5 Years).

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/
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Figure 17: Total Trade with China vs. Expected Years of Schooling in Children (No Lag).

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/

Observations from the World Bank suggest that the state of education remains
poor overall: the net primary school attendance rate is only 67 percent with significant
disparities across states and gender. According to the 2012 Education Status Report, the
World Bank notes that the negative impact of poverty, rural-urban disparities, and gender
inequalities are key contributors to low levels of education (The World Bank 2015). The
story of education in Sudan is not dissimilar from that of healthcare; China can only be
relied on so much to help the cause. In order to accelerate human development, the
Sudanese government must promote more programs in rural regions and make an effort
to promote gender equality in education.

Achacoso 57
Implications for Sudan and South Sudan
Despite the wealth that Sudan gained from its economic engagement with China
over the last fifteen years, human development indicators remain low, and Sudan ranks
166th out of 187 countries in the UNDP‘s latest HDI calculation. HDI increased but at a
pace that far lagged the influx of new revenues. The major problem lies in Sudan‘s
failure to translate oil revenues into investment for human development. It failed to
diversify its economy outside of oil or promote the growth of the private sector. Even
with China‘s contribution to infrastructure, Sudan remains in an infrastructure deficit
outside of major cities. Internal conflict, displacement of its population, corruption by
governmental elites, political instability, and general economic uncertainty all prevented
the creation of a conducive environment for business development, growth, and
employment.

Furthermore, this research shows that the secession of South Sudan

introduced a new shock into Sudan‘s economy, putting further development progress at
great risk. Data showed the negative socioeconomic development effects of dependence
on one product. Without China, Sudan‘s economy is left in an extremely vulnerable
state.
Another implication which affects Sino-Sudanese engagement has been China‘s
historical policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, most noticeably in its views
toward the conflict in Darfur. The international community has accused China of turning
a blind eye toward humanitarian crises, and the relationship between China and Sudan
has been a central focus of human rights. This has been coupled with criticism of China
for dealing with dictators, as the rogue government of Sudan under President Omar alBashir has been China‘s most controversial partner in Africa.

The story is rather
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straightforward: As Sudan‘s civil war wound down, two rebel groups in the Darfur
region attacked police and military to which the government brutally retaliated by
bombing rebel-held villages. The Sudanese government provided arms and support to
local militias, who committed violent crimes, rape, displacement, burning of villages.
Essentially, China‘s purchases of Sudanese oil enabled Sudan to buy Chinese arms,
which were then used against the rebels in Darfur; the Sudanese were effectively
attacking their own citizens. China took a business-as-usual approach, claiming arms
sales were legal and followed terms of a UN embargo on Sudan.

After much

international pressure, China later retraced its view, and Beijing sent a strong message to
the Sudanese government while also sending a peacekeeping force to Darfur. The key
takeaway is that China has shifted from being part of the problem to being part of the
solution, as Brautigam notes that ―[China‘s] level of coordination and cooperation has
been improving‖ (2009, 282).
The incident in Darfur may serve as a catalyst for a change in China‘s policy
toward non-interference. In terms of development, the benefits of a trade relationship are
clear, but such a shift in foreign policy may now put China in a position to subdue
conflict and promote human development in its African trading partners.

Sudan,

however, must also strive to find stability and eliminate violence on its own, in an effort
to create a positive investment climate.
Developing nations have plenty to learn from Sudan and Angola. South Sudan is
one of the youngest countries in the world, but also holds the dubious distinction as the
most oil-dependent country, according to the World Bank. It must promote a peaceful
and positive investment climate in order to attract trade and FDI. It must learn to
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diversify its economy outside of oil in the event that China pulls out as a partner, and it
must invest in healthcare and education to promote a healthy and skilled workforce to
serve as the basis for a stable economy.

South Africa
Like Angola and Sudan, South Africa‘s history has been plagued by its share of
internal conflict, characterized by decades of apartheid.

The apartheid regime had

isolated South Africa from the international community, and economic sanctions had
limited its opportunities for global trade. Fortunately, the end of apartheid in 1994 led to
a lifting of sanctions, opening the door for the country to re-engage with the world by
focusing on foreign policy and trade. China played a key role in their plan. Prior to
1998, South African relations with mainland China—the People‘s Republic of China—
were practically non-existent due to South Africa‘s diplomatic relations with Taiwan, or
the Republic of China. However, in 1998 South Africa shifted its diplomatic allegiance
from Taiwan to Beijing, and with it came new opportunities for economic growth.
South Africa makes for an appropriate sample case study for a number of reasons.
Because of the very low levels of economic engagement prior to China‘s economic
boom, South Africa serves as a logical baseline from which to measure China‘s impact
during the 2000s. Furthermore, South Africa, albeit just one state amongst 54 African
countries, ―arguably provides China‘s African engagement with legitimacy because of its
role as continental leader‖ (Grimm, et al. 2013, 16).

Therefore, because of South

Africa‘s de facto position as an African leader, the impact of China on its economic and
human development may serve as a model—or at least, a barometer—of the potential
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impact on other developing countries. In 2000, South Africa had an HDI value of 0.622
which would classify it as a medium human development country. The relatively high
value of GNI per capita of $7,462, compared to other African nations is offset by low life
expectancy at birth of 54.8 years (United Nations Development Programme 2013).

How does South African engage with China?

South Africa‘s engagement with China is shaped by a number of actors, including
the South African government, China‘s development banks, Chinese state-owned
enterprises, and both Chinese and South African private enterprises. Trade is again the
focal point of the relationship, given China‘s position as South Africa‘s largest trading
partner—in very similar fashion to Angola, Sudan, and South Sudan. On the other hand,
South Africa accounts for nearly 20 percent of China‘s total trade with the African
continent (Grimm, et al. 2013, 17), which underscores its importance to the economic
health of the region. From a Chinese perspective, South Africa‘s natural resource bounty
and industrial capacity serve as pull factors, given its rich stores of diamonds, gold, coal,
iron ore, platinum, manganese, chromium, and copper (Grimm, et al. 2013, 16). As a
result, the mining sector forms the core of the economy. Agriculture and manufacturing
in food and textiles also make up a substantial portion of the economy. Petroleum,
however, is largely absent and does not contribute to South Africa‘s exports.
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Figure 18: Total Trade with China from 2000-2013, plus Exports to China as a Percentage of GDP.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. http://www.imf.org/

South African exports to China have grown at a tremendous pace, having risen
from $335 million in 2000 to more than $12 billion in 2013 (The World Bank 2015).
Imports from China have grown in a similar fashion, rising from $1 billion to $16 billion
in the same timeframe. South African exports overwhelmingly consist of raw materials
while the country imports mostly manufactured goods. The result of a trade relationship
is a concerning imbalance whereby imports significantly outweigh exports. China has
become a more important part of South Africa‘s economy, as evidenced by the growth of
Exports to China from near-zero levels in 2000 to 3.4 percent of overall GDP in 2013.
The economy of South Africa is far larger and more diversified than the previous case
studies, but trade volumes on an absolute scale are comparable to that of Angola. Figure
18 illustrates the tremendous growth in trade. Note that unlike Angola and Sudan, the
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trade imbalance is reversed in favor of China, given that imports from China outweigh
the exports, as illustrated by Figure 18; nonetheless, both have continued to grow rapidly.
The green line indicates how China has become an increasingly large part of South
Africa‘s economy.
In addition to trade, infrastructure financing deals between South Africa and
China have increased in number and value within the last three years. Historically, the
number of financing deals with South Africa have been far more limited than with
Angola and Sudan, but more recent transactions have garnered much attention to their
multi-billion dollar values.

From 2006 to 2007, Chinese financed new projects in

chromium mines and factories to the tune of $1 billion (Foster, et al. 2009, 37). It was
not until years later that volumes picked up. In 2011 the Development Bank of South
Africa and the China Development Bank signed an agreement for $2.5 billion with the
goal of mutual investment in mining, infrastructure, transport, communication, energy,
and agricultural projects (Grimm, et al. 2013, 16). Then, as recently as 2015, China
Development Bank agreed to provide a $5 billion loan to the South African state-owned
company Transnet to help rehabilitate railways and port infrastructure (The Heritage
Foundation and The American Enterprise Institute 2015). Given the recent timing of
such infrastructure deals, their impact will fall outside of the scope of the research as their
contribution to development may take another few years to materialize.
For South Africa, FDI has been a particularly strong source of economic
engagement with China. Its relatively stable and established economy makes for a more
conducive environment for attracting foreign investment. Additionally, South Africa
possesses better manufacturing capacity than other African countries, and thus enjoys a
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competitive advantage over its neighbors when dealing with China. From 2006 to 2013,
South African enterprises have experienced FDI inflows of at least $9 billion (The
Heritage Foundation and The American Enterprise Institute 2015). In a prime example of
FDI, China‘s largest bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, purchased a 20
percent stake in South Africa‘s largest bank, Standard Bank, for $5.5 billion, representing
the single largest FDI flow into the country (Bloomberg 2014). This transaction alone
represents a dominant piece of the pie shown in Figure 19. As one might notice, the FDI
landscape in South Africa is strikingly different from that of Angola‘s—where most
inflows went toward the real estate sector—and also very different from Sudan‘s, where
most inflows were directed toward energy. The fact that the financial sector is the
primary source of inflows underscores the more advanced economy of South Africa and
how well the country has diversified its opportunities outside of purely extractive
industries.
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Figure 19: Total FDI Flows by Sector 2006-2013.

Source: The Heritage Foundation/American Enterprise Institute.

What are the effects on development?
#1. South Africa does not nearly rely on China for revenues as much as oilreliant countries like Angola, Sudan, and South Sudan do.
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Figure 20: Sudan’s Exports to China as a Percentage of Overall GDP. Source: IMF, UNDP

This is due to the fact that economic engagement between South Africa and
China, though growing, represents only a small portion of South Africa‘s overall
economic might. It has also proved difficult to qualitatively assess China‘s contribution
to the economy because of the sheer size of South Africa‘s GDP, a sum measured in the
hundreds of billion dollars. Indeed, trade with China garners increasing importance to
the economy, but the growth in GDP can also be attributable to partnerships with other
countries besides China. This means that South Africa has developed a broad base of
trading partnerships over a diverse set of products in different sectors. Therefore, in the
event that China was to reduce its purchases, South Africa remains better equipped to
absorb economic shocks than the other sample countries.
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#2. South Africa’s human development index has been increasing in concert
with economic engagement with China, most notably with Total Trade.

Figure 21: South Africa: Economic Engagement with China vs. HDI, lagged 5 years.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/ and The World Bank Open Data,
http://data.worldbank.org, UNDP Open Data, https://data.undp.org/, and The China Global Investment Tracker, The
Heritage Foundation/American Enterprise Institute (2015)

As Figure 21 illustrates, HDI has been increasing at a steady in pace in line with
the growth of Total Trade with China. The correlation coefficient between the two
variables is 0.97 which may seem unsustainably high but nonetheless indicates a strong
relationship. The R Square of the two variables is also 0.97 which suggests that Total
Trade is a strong predictor of HDI. Critics may deem such high R Square and correlation
figures as spurious, but it should be noted that analyses for Angola and Sudan revealed
similar relationships; the qualitative data in those cases seemed to support the growth in
HDI. For South Africa, infrastructure financing and FDI opportunities were limited in
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scope during the earlier parts of Sino-South African engagement; only recently did those
sectors gain momentum, so their contribution to human development may not be realized
for another three to five years. Figures 20 and 21 also show that South Africa‘s GNI Per
Capita has been steadily increasing, which positively impacts HDI.
#3. Healthcare in South Africa is improving due to increased government
spending, but in practicality, China may have very little to do with it. The size of
South Africa‘s economy makes conclusions on China‘s impact on healthcare more
muddled, whereas Angola and Sudan‘s dependence on Chinese trade revenues led to
more conclusive evidence about healthcare spending.

Figure 22 shows a dramatic

increase in general government healthcare expenditure following the path of increased
Chinese imports. Despite its strong correlation coefficient of 0.97, trade with China only
makes up 3.4 percent of South Africa‘s GDP at its peak, so the source of funds devoted to
healthcare is difficult to trace. The same may be said about life expectancy at birth.
Starting in 2005, life expectancy at birth experienced a dramatic uptrend that seemingly
traces the increase in Total Trade with China, rising from 51.7 years to 56.9 years in the
span of eight years. This increase has a directly positive impact on HDI.

However,

qualitative observations suggest that the recent recovery is largely attributed to the rapid
expansion of the antiretroviral treatment programs to fight HIV/AIDS, while also
supported by declines in both adult and infant mortality (The World Bank 2015). Having
run this analysis on South Africa, this research finds difficulty in attributing
improvements in healthcare to China-related economic gains due a multitude of potential
outside factors.

On the other hand, for countries like Angola and Sudan, whose
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economies depend heavily on China, the relationship‘s impact on human development is
much more evident.
Figure 22. Total Trade with China vs. Healthcare Expenditure per Capita.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, http://www.imf.org/ and The World Bank Open Data,
http://data.worldbank.org

Achacoso 69

Figure 23. Total Trade with China vs. Life Expectancy at Birth. Source: IMF, UDNP

4.1.1 Implications for South Africa
For all the benefits of its burgeoning economic relationship with China, South
Africa has run into unintended consequences. As the data shows, imports have risen
dramatically from around $1 billion in 2000 to $16 billion in 2013 due to the increased
appetite for inexpensive Chinese manufactured goods. Access to affordable cell phones,
computers, and other consumer goods certainly creates benefits for most Africans.
However, these goods may be a cause for domestic concern. The imports of cheaper,
mass-produced alternatives have negatively affected industries such as textile
manufacturing, and these developments have led to adverse perceptions of Chinese
engagement in South Africa. The introduction of cheaper alternatives has driven South
African manufacturers out of the market, and some scholars have estimated that 75,000
jobs have been lost as a result (Grimm, et al. 2013, 17). Recent news reports state
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otherwise—that China‘s business presence has actually positively contributed to the local
economy. However, as China becomes a more integral part of South Africa‘s economy,
South Africa must protect itself against any further trade-related asymmetry in their
relationship with China. If they cannot guard against it, the relationship may end up
doing more harm than good to the South African economy.
Another implication for South Africa requires a look internally. South Africa
remains a dual economy with one of the highest inequality rates in the world. The top 10
percent of the population accounts for 58 percent of the country‘s income; however, the
bottom 10 percent accounts for a mere 0.5 percent of the country‘s income, and the
bottom half is responsible for less than 8 percent (The World Bank 2015). The increased
export revenues coming from China seem to benefit only public and private enterprises
and the upper middle class involved in those businesses. The increase in imports from
China likely benefits the bottom half of the population, providing them with a source of
cheap consumer goods; however, local workers may be hurt by the loss of jobs to
Chinese counterparts. The imbalance between these two spheres within the economy
ultimately hinders human development. The inequality data suggest that South Africa
may not be taking full advantage of its relationship with China. South Africa must use
the opportunity of economic engagement to benefit its broad spectrum of citizens as only
then will the country experience maximum developmental progress.

5 Alternative Implications of Engagement
The previous sections have offered implications of Chinese relations for each of
the sample countries. The following sections will use the results of the case studies to
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draw broader conclusions for other African countries which are just beginning to embark
on an economic relationship with China, while offering new questions for policymakers
to consider as their level of engagement deepens.

Are resource-poor countries left in the dust?
As this research has found, resource-rich9 countries have reaped significant benefits
to economic and human development due to their relationship with China. On the other
hand, what does China mean for smaller, resource-poor African countries? Inherently,
countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Benin, Ghana, and Mozambique have limited means
by which to attract China‘s attention.

Other than serving as an export market for

Chinese-manufactured goods, they do not naturally possess the resources that China
craves. However, this does not mean that resource-poor countries cannot enjoy some
benefits. Ethiopia, for example, has received $1.6 billion in infrastructure financing from
China through 2007 toward the construction of hydroelectric dams, roads, and telecom
networks (The World Bank 2015). While access to favorable financing is encouraging,
the truth of the matter is the economic relationships of resource-poor countries are largely
one-sided in favor of China. As Eisenman (2012) notes, ―On a country-by-country basis
the balance of trade between China and resource exporters tends to favor the African
country, [while] China‘s exports dominate its commerce with non-resource exporting
African trade partners‖, meaning that an African country‘s lack of resources will cause a
trade imbalance in favor of China.

9

This imbalance potentially puts resource-poor

According to the World Bank, a country is defined as resource-rich if over 1980-2010 on average more

than 5 percent of its GDP has been derived from oil and non-oil minerals (excluding forests).

Achacoso 72
countries at a disadvantage. However, the lack of resources does not necessarily preclude
China from engaging with resource-poor countries for political reasons; motives for
engagement do not necessarily have to be economic in nature.
On the positive side, such countries will have access to cheap consumer goods that
may promote well-being—mobile phones and personal computers, for example.
However, the relationship does not create wealth for its population nor does it necessarily
promote economic or human development.

Clearly, a country can neither convert

imports into GDP, nor into a higher HDI rating. As this research shows, the primary
driver of economic and human development for the sample countries is Total Trade, and
to a lesser degree, infrastructure financing and FDI inflows. Furthermore, according to
Eisenman (2012), the risk of large sustained trade deficits may have destabilizing
political effects over time. Therefore, resource-poor countries must tread cautiously in
their engagement with China, taking care to avoid large deficits and foster a balanced
relationship as much as possible.

5.1 If China sneezes, will Africa catch a cold?
This research shows that countries which derive most of their GDP from oil exports
put themselves at greater risk of economic shock, especially when their largest trading
partner is China. This risk materialized in Sudan, whose economy suffered significantly
after South Sudan essentially ran away with oil revenues. In terms of potential shocks,
African countries must take note of China‘s slowdown in economic growth over the last
five years:
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Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Annual % GDP Growth 10.4 % 9.3 % 7.7 % 7.7 % 7.4 %
Source: World Bank

The data shows that China‘s economy is growing at a slower pace, driven by a cooling
property sector and local governments struggling with heavy debt burdens. China‘s
extraordinary period of double-digit growth and rapid expansion is likely over, and as a
consequence, its demand for natural resources to fuel its economy will likely slow down
as well. What can this research predict for African nations who are dependent on trade
with China?

Given the strong correlation between high levels of engagement and

development, countries such as Angola and Sudan must prepare for their own economic
slowdowns. The resulting decreased GDP will hinder governments‘ ability to spend on
education, healthcare, and infrastructure, lessening the prospects for sustained
development. Also, the potential for infrastructure deals backed by China may also
become more limited in scope and in size. On the other hand, South Africa‘s economy,
through its diversity in trading partners and products, is better equipped to weather a
storm should China‘s economy slow down or contract. Indeed, if China sneezes, oildependent nations which trade with China will catch a cold. The best preventative
measures are to diversify its trading partners and develop economic sectors outside of
oil—two actions that are easier said than done given the inefficiency of certain African
governments.

5.2 Does China‘s approach challenge the concept of aid?
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Earlier in this research, I reviewed traditional Western overseas development
assistance, comparing China‘s unique approach to economic cooperation which bundles
aid, trade, and investment into cohesive packages.

Should Western actors adopt this

possible evolution of aid? The case studies in this research have revealed an overall
positive impact on a recipient country‘s economic and human development due to
economic cooperation with China. Beijing‘s aid policy emphasizes ―win-win‖ scenarios
and ―mutually beneficial‖ cooperation in the hope of creating of self-reliant economies in
the future. China believes that by helping develop African countries for the future—via
debt relief, infrastructure financing and investment—they will create sustainable trade
partners to the benefit of its own economy. For example, they have helped construct new
highways and roads to connect cities and lower the costs of both goods and
transportation. They have built and rehabilitated power plants and transmission lines to
distribute sustainable and reliable energy to rural and urban areas. They have expanded
telecom networks that will help improve business, communication, and connectivity.
They have constructed hospitals, clinics, and schools to help foster a healthy and skilled
workforce that will form the basis of young, stable economies. China has demonstrated
that, at least in the short term, they have helped more than hurt the developing countries.
Western actors such as the G7 nations, the IMF, and the World Bank may need to revisit
the way they approach ODA. The path to successful aid may not be in the form of
burdensome loans filled with concessions, but rather, a sustainable trade partnership that
fosters growth in both the donor and the recipient.

6 Conclusion
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To reiterate, this research has found that high levels of economic engagement
between select African countries and China have contributed to their overall economic
and human development. Natural resource exports have been the primary driver in
generating increased economic wealth, directly impacting GDP and GDP Per Capita.
Chinese-backed infrastructure financing and FDI flows from Chinese private enterprises
to African business have also helped promote economic and social development, though
their effects are likely to materialize more clearly in the coming years.

Revenue

generated from trade with China has allowed governments to invest more in education
and healthcare sectors, and data has shown a correlation between Total Trade with China
and an increase in metrics that contribute to the Human Development Index, namely in
GNI Per Capita, Life Expectancy at Birth, and Expected Years of Schooling in Children.
This research has also revealed potential concerns for countries which are overly
dependent on oil exports and on China—namely Angola, Sudan, and South Sudan. Their
inefficiency at translating oil windfalls into developing other sectors of their economy
may haunt them in the event of a slowdown in Chinese demand for natural resources.
More developed economies like South Africa, though not without their flaws, serve as a
model for African countries in their dealings with China through a more diversified
approach to engagement.
Despite continued but declining growth, China‘s future course remains unclear,
and so too are the economic paths of African nations which engage with China.
Scenarios may play out in either one of two divergent paths. Firstly, with today‘s
depressed prices in oil, China may seek to grow their demand in natural resources. At the
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time of this writing, crude oil prices have wavered around $59 per barrel,10 a far cry from
the peak of $145 a barrel in 2008, and just off historical lows over the last ten years. The
same can be said for iron ore and gold prices. Should China take advantage of cheaper
commodities pricing, resource-rich African countries can use the opportunity of higher
levels of engagement with China to help progress both economic and human
development across its broad spectrum of citizens. It will become even more important
for African states to make the best strategic use of all external infrastructure financing to
promote growth and advancement of its people. Of course, the downside scenario is that
China‘s economy slows down or contracts, which exposes the vulnerability of oildependent countries such as Angola, Sudan, and South Sudan. They must take care to
develop their economies now while the engagement with China is healthy because the
opportunity may have a finite duration.
What do African states need to do in light of this research?

The path to

sustainable economic and human development is far easier said than done. Much of a
country‘s success will depend on external factors such as product demand, diplomatic
relations, or investment climate. However, there are common internal issues that African
states must address in order to maximize the opportunities presented by China‘s presence.
Firstly, governments must address openness and take accountability of concessions and
trade agreements. In the cases of Angola and Sudan, negotiations with China rest solely
in the domain of governmental elites which creates an environment conducive to
corruption and leaves the public in the dark about opportunities for their own

10

Source: NYMEX, Crude Oil WTI price on May 3, 2015.
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development. Mandating public disclosure allows for discussions on future trade and
investment, giving private businesses and entrepreneurs a chance to participate in growth.
Secondly, African states need a clear and transparent regulatory framework to
curb corruption by both governments and companies. African states should consider
ratifying and implementing the UN Convention Against Corruption to hold governments
internationally accountable. Corruption prevents the distribution of wealth and widens
the inequality gap between elites and the poor.

Qualitative observations from this

research suggest that economic and human development cannot be sustainable without
the broad participation of a country‘s citizens. China, as a model for developing nations,
serves as a prime example for African countries that reducing poverty can directly
translate into a successful economy, and vice-versa.
Thirdly, violence is an obvious hindrance to a stable economy, and elimination
thereof is an absolute prerequisite to promoting a positive economic climate. Only then
will other governments and foreign enterprises consider investing in that country. Even
China, whose controversial policy of non-interference governed their engagement for
numerous years, has shifted its course with Sudan, growing less tolerant of conflict and
human rights abuses.
Finally, African states must learn from each other‘s past interactions with China
in order to pursue a course that best protects its interests. African neighbors must learn
from Sudan and observe how the loss of oil revenues can severely impact an economy.
South Sudan must learn from mature nations on ways to diversify the economy and avoid
the dubious distinction as the most oil-dependent country in the world. Resource-poor
nations must learn to prevent large trade deficits with China. China has been actively
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engaging nearly all countries in Africa, though these relationships are in differing stages
of maturity. This list is by no means comprehensive, and there is likely a longer to-do
list, but African governments must consider implementing these measures if they are to
maximize the opportunity with China to promote economic and human development for
their country.
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